Palgrave Studies in Indigenous Psychology

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Palgrave Studies in Indigenous Psychology aims to introduce psychologists and social scientists to the indigenous psychology movement and to major theoretical and practical issues discussed in this tradition. It publishes books that make significant contributions to psychology in the era of globalization by asking important questions about the discipline, profession, and practice of psychology. The series critically appraises cultural assumptions and theoretical frameworks; sheds light on the dialectics of the universal and the particular in human subjectivity; goes beyond Western psychology in researching the ontological, epistemological, ethical, spiritual, and aesthetic dimensions of the mental life; addresses issues of structural oppression in the globalizing era; and explores possibilities for a more equitable global psychology. Given the interdisciplinary nature of indigenous psychology, this book series welcomes contributions from all disciplines in the social sciences and the humanities. In particular, it welcomes scholarship that embodies a critical thinking that is informed by the local knowledge, and inspired by the spiritual strivings of a culture.

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FOREWORD: NEUROSCIENCE VERSUS CULTURAL SYSTEM: DIRECTION OF RESEARCH FOR CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY

The Taiwanese Psychological Association invited Prof. Shinobu Kitayama from the University of Michigan, USA, to give a keynote speech in its annual meeting held at Cheng-Kung University, Tainan, from September 15–16, 2016. Professor Kitayama is an old acquaintance of mine; we first met 20 years ago at Kyoto University in Japan when the Asian Association of Social Psychology held its bi-annual conference. Before that, he published a widely cited article on the independent self and interdependent self (Markus & Kitayama, 1991), and became one of the most famous Asian psychologists in the international community of psychology.

A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN TWO APPROACHES IN CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY

Professor Kitayama was invited by the Department of Psychology, National Taiwan University, to give a lecture on ‘Research of Culture Neuroscience on Emotion: Achievement and Future Direction’ on September 18th, 2016. Subsequently, I made a 30-minute comment on his presentation entitled, ‘Neuroscience or Cultural System: Direction of Research for Cultural Psychology,’ in which I mentioned his commentary on previous research related to individualism–collectivism published in a special issue of Psychological Bulletin (Kitayama, 2002). He had indicated that cross-cultural research on psychological process by any instrument of measurement should be interpreted from a system view of
culture. Unfortunately, Kitayama himself has since moved away from this approach. He and his colleagues have compiled a great deal of empirical data in the field of cross-cultural research on neuro-imaging with fMRI.

This is totally the wrong direction if we are to understand the subjectivity of East Asian cultures. This reductionist approach tries to capture the cultural differences by reducing them to some pan-cultural dimensions measured by either a paper-and-pencil instrument or fMRI. But the accumulation of fragmentary data cannot provide a whole picture of the cultural system (Hwang, 2015). I will begin my arguments with a brief review on the weakness of previous research on individualism–collectivism.

**Positivist Research on Individualism and Collectivism**

The most popular culture theory, which has been widely used for cross-cultural comparison is the research paradigm of individualism and collectivism. Hofstede (1980), a well-known Dutch organizational psychologist, was the first to conduct research on individualism–collectivism. When he was a director in the department of human resource management at IBM, Hofstede constructed a scale of 32 items to measure work goals or values. He administered this scale to equivalent and stratified samples of IBM staff in 40 countries, calculated means of their endorsement on 32 work values for samples from each country and created a correlation matrix amongst the 32 average nation-values. Four factors were thus obtained as a result of factor analysis: individualism, power distance, masculinity and uncertainty avoidance. Factor scores of the 40 countries were marked to show their positions on the map constituted by any two of these four dimensions, respectively.

His empirical mapping of the world’s 40 major countries on these four cultural dimensions attracted great attention from the psychology community. Inspired by this work, in the following decades many psychologists began to conduct research on related topics. Indeed, a tremendous amount of research has been done on the dimension of individualism–collectivism. For example, an intensive review by Oyserman, Kemmelmeier, and Coon (2002) showed that psychologists had constructed at least 27 distinct scales for measuring individualism–collectivism (IND–COL) tendencies, and completed numerous empirical studies on related topics in the last two decades.
Most researchers engaging in this topic generally consider collectivism to be the opposite of individualism. They assumed that the social structure of Western societies shaped by Protestantism and the process of civic emancipation contributed to such psychological traits of individualism as individual freedom, right of choice, self-realization and so on (Triandis, 1995). In this way, countries or ethnic groups that inherited a Protestant tradition should demonstrate more individualistic characteristics than the traditional cultures of non-Western countries. Therefore, individualism is more prevalent in Western industrialized countries than in other countries, especially in contrast to the more traditional societies of developing countries. As such, the individualistic tendencies of European–Americans in the USA should be higher than other minority groups, and their tendencies for collectivism should be lower than that of other minority groups (Oyserman et al., 2002).

**Philosophy of Anti-reductionism**

Researchers in this field have mostly followed a research orientation of positivism. They adopted the method of trait approach to personality psychology, conceptualized individualism or collectivism as a kind of psychological syndrome, and constructed various scales to measure traits and to test their hypotheses. This approach represents typical research in Western psychology, which has been deliberately constructed on the presumption of individuality, reductionism, experiment-based empiricism, scientism, quantification/measurement, materialism, and objectivity so as to obtain homothetic laws (Marsella, 2009).

Some researchers have even attempted to formulate theories in support of this stance once they had accumulated a certain amount of empirical data. However, from the perspective of post-positivism, a theory is constructed by scientists through their creative imagination for explaining observed facts (Hempel, 1966), rather than induced from data accumulated via empirical research. In order to illustrate his philosophy of evolutionary epistemology, Popper (1972) proposed the metaphor of a bucket and a searchlight to explain the difference between these two approaches: the accumulation of empirical data might be viewed as pouring water into a bucket. It is impossible for any theory to emerge from it even the bucket is filling up with the water of empirical facts. He argued that a theory is something like a searchlight that has
been constructed by a scientist with his creative imagination. Once con-
structed, the searchlight might cast light on the future.

**Pan-Cultural Dimensions**

When researchers attempt to induce theory from findings of empirical
studies on individualism–collectivism, they may encounter many diffi-
culties—as do other positivists. For example, Triandis (1994), the first
psychologist who attempted to produce such a theory, conceptualized
individualism and collectivism as two independent dimensions that can
exist simultaneously to varying degrees within an individual in different
cultural contexts. By contrast, Hofstede (1980), who adopted an eco-
logical factor analysis method for his study at a cultural level, conceptual-
ized individualism (IND) and collectivism (COL) as two opposite poles
of one dimension.

In order to emphasize the difference between the individual and
cultural level, Triandis (1994) proposed a set of contrasts between
idiocentrics and allocentrics as a way to indicate the concept of
individualism–collectivism at the individual level. Triandis attempted to
define these two sets of personality dispositions with various attributes.
However, in his attempt to define these two sets of concepts at the the-
oretical level, several obvious weaknesses of the positivist approach were
revealed.

First, when Triandis (1994) attempted to define allocentrics with a
group of attributes, he often used the antithetical attributes of the idi-
ocentrics to define the personality disposition. This method of theoreti-
cal construction, however, inevitably invites the question: is this a correct
way to describe behavior in so-called collectivist cultures? Put another
way, is it appropriate that psychologists studying individualism–collec-
tivism have taken European–American psychological characteristics as a
frame of reference for constructing their images of other cultural groups?
European–Americans are situated at one end of the dimension with their
cultural and psychological characteristics used as coordinates of reference
for understanding other ethnic groups around the world. These other
ethnic groups are situated at different locations along the dimension,
suggesting that their cultural identities are so vague that their own psy-
chological characteristics can be understood only if they are described in
contrast to Americans.
For this reason, Fiske (2002) has criticized previous research on individualism–collectivism and indicated that individualism is the sum of cultural characteristics by which Americans define themselves, while collectivism is formalized to show characteristics of the antithetical other in accordance with the American ideological understanding that “[w]e are not that kind of person” (p. 84).

In other words, this trait approach represents a kind of Orientalism in psychology (Said, 1994); it attempts to understand non-Western cultures from the perspective of Western centrism. The traits approach for developing the individualism–collectivism scale—as adopted by Triandis (1994) to describe idiocentrics and allocentrics—used the methods of behavioral sampling to select representative items from constructing a scale. This approach attempts to use a ‘catchall’ way to represent various contents of cultural differences (Bond, 2002; Hofstede, 1994; Hui & Yee, 1994; Kagitcibasi, 1997; Rohner, 1984; Triandis, 1994). A careful examination of scales in terms of their components will show that their contents vary substantially. If this is the case, what are the adequate attributes for representing the personality dispositions of individualism–collectivism?

Earley and Gibson (1998, p. 291) pointed out that there are no parallels in the content measured by individualism and collectivism. Speaking rather bluntly, regarding to the highly varied operational definitions of individualism and collectivism, they deemed these scales to measure irrelevant underlying constructs. Oyserman et al. (2002, p. 28), analyzed the content of the 27 individualism–collectivism scales most widely used in cross-cultural studies and showed individualism to comprise seven components including independence, individual goal striving, competition, uniqueness, self-privacy, self-knowledge, and direct communication; while collectivism embodies eight components including relatedness, group-belonging, duty, harmony, seeking advice from others, contextualization, hierarchy, and preference for group work. The lack of parallels between components of individualism and collectivism suggests that it is inadequate to compare them directly.
A Yet-to-be-Developed Approach of Collectivism

An analysis by Oyserman et al. (2002) indicated that early understandings of individualism and collectivism represent two types of different behavioral categories. They indicated that there is considerable heterogeneity among conceptual definitions of collectivism and the contents of scales for measuring it. The cultural difference in this respect reflects its multifaceted nature in the way of connections between an individual and others. Following an intensive review of previous literature, they pointed out that:

American and Western psychology are infused with an understanding of human nature on the basis of individualism, raising the question of our ability to separate our current way of understanding human nature based on individualism from a yet to be developed approach of collectivism (Oyserman et al., 2002, pp. 44–45).

After a similar review and re-analysis of the data in previous literature, Schimmack, Oishi, and Diener (2005) indicated that the conceptual definition of individualism is clear, that instruments for measuring it are significant, and that it is a valid and important dimension for measuring cultural differences. However, the definitions of collectivism are ambiguous and varied, and the validity of instruments for measuring it is undetermined. Therefore, they suggested that it is necessary for cross-cultural psychologists to re-evaluate the meaning of collectivism.

Philosophy of Science

Instead of locating cultures of the world along such pan-cultural dimensions as individualism and collectivism, the cultural system approach requests social scientists to capture the complexity of a given culture through the use of adequate paradigms of Western philosophy of science. A comprehensive understanding on the dialectical relationships among various paradigms of Western philosophy of science is a necessary but not sufficient condition for constructing culture-inclusive theories of psychology. In order to help Chinese young scholars, understand the progress of Western philosophy of science, I spent more than ten years writing the book Logics of Social Science (Hwang, 2001/2013), which addresses different perspectives on crucial issues of ontology,
epistemology and methodology proposed by 18 noted Western philosophers in the twentieth century.

The first half of this book addressed to the switch in the philosophy of natural science from positivism to post-positivism. The second half expounds the philosophy of social science, including structuralism, hermeneutic and critical science. It is one of my eternal beliefs that in order to overcome the difficulties encountered in the work of theoretical construction, non-Western psychologists have to understand not only their own cultural tradition, but also the Western philosophy of science. Based on such a belief, since appointed as the principal investigator of the Project in Search of Excellence for Research on Chinese Indigenous Psychology at the beginning of 2000, I have constantly attempted to resolve the difficulties of constructing culture-inclusive theories in psychology by using various paradigms in Western philosophy of science.

PARADIGMS OF THE MAINSTREAM APPROACH

Michael Bond is a pioneer psychologist who has opened up the field of Chinese psychology. He published the first English-language book on Chinese psychology (Bond, 1986), followed by two volumes of the Handbook of Chinese Psychology (Bond, 1996, 2010), which successfully brought the term ‘Chinese psychology’ to the attention of the international psychological community. The latest version of Oxford Handbook of Chinese Psychology (Bond, 2010), contains 41 chapters by 87 authors who intensively reviewed previous works on a variety of topics related to Chinese psychology.

Nonetheless, with a careful review of that book, Lee (2011) indicated that he: “was somewhat puzzled and bothered by the fact that the book does not have a clear structure.” It is thus difficult for readers to quickly learn what is included in the book and to identify the chapter on a specific topic unless they go through the whole table of contents carefully. He remarked: “There is a general lack of theory in the whole handbook.” The topic-oriented chapters have done a great job in reviewing and reporting extensively empirical findings in the field regarding the Chinese people. However, very few chapters offer indigenous theories of Chinese psychology. Most of them stay at the level of confirming/disconfirming Western findings, referring to well-know cultural dimensions such as collectivism and power distance to explain the variation found, despite the openly stated effort to push for indigenous research.
Moreover, most of the studies cited in the book simply “dichotomized their findings as Chinese vs. Western, failing to capture the much more refined complexity of the world.” (pp. 271–272).

Soon after the publication of Foundations of Chinese Psychology (Hwang, 2012), the Committee for Promoting Indigenous Psychology invited ten well-established cultural and indigenous psychologists to attend the international conference, The Construction of Culture-Inclusive Theories in Psychology, sponsored by the Institute for Advanced Studies in Humanities and Social Sciences, National Taiwan University, Taiwan, from June 1–2, 2013.

Bond was invited to give an opening address at the conference, in which he reviewed his academic life. In his keynote speech, he also explicitly illustrated his approach to studying the psychology of Chinese people.

**A Confrontation Between Two Approaches**

This seminar witnessed a confrontation between the two approaches for studying indigenous psychology: the pan-cultural dimension approach vs. cultural system approach. Bond (2015) defended the pan-cultural dimension approach and argued that “we must develop measures of psychological constructs that are metrically equivalent across a host of cultural groups” in building models of interpersonal behavior. He also gave a list of well-known psychological constructs, including dimensions or domains of values (e.g., Bond, 1988; Schwartz, 1992, respectively), types of self-construal (e.g., Gudykunst et al., 1996), social axioms or beliefs about the world (Leung & Bond, 2004), motives such as distinctiveness (Becker et al., 2012), and dimensions of stereotyping used by individual perceivers (Cuddy et al., 2009).

That is a typical derived etic approach of reductionism that has been used frequently by mainstream psychologists. Bond (2015) indicated that some of these adduced constructs have a provenance outside of the mainstream and are indigenous in origin, but applicable pan-culturally. Such a macroscopic approach of cross-cultural psychology tries to allocate various cultural groups in the world along one or several universal dimensions that constitute the scientific microworlds or psychological space constructed by psychologists.

All those pan-cultural dimensions could be said to be kinds of ‘culture-inclusive theories’ in psychology. However, that approach
does not treat any concrete culture as a cultural system. In *Indigenous Psychology: Grounding Science in Culture, Why and How?*, Sundararajan (2015) strongly opposed such a dimensional approach for studying culture. She argued that such dichotomous dimensions as individualism vs. collectivism, or independent vs. interdependent self-construal, may perpetuate the long shadows of Orientalism in psychology. “The difference detected by the one dimensional measure may be a difference that makes no difference psychologically to the local culture” (p. 236). Therefore, she cited Fiske (2002, p. 87): “We [Western psychology] must transcend our ethnocentric framework and not just study how other cultures differ from the United States but explore what they are intrinsically,” and advocated using the complex models of cultural or system approach to replace the dimensional approach.

**A More Culturally Sensitive Future**

Bond (2015) also acknowledged the importance of initiatives outside of the mainstream WEIRD nations in extending the disciplinary compass of Western psychology. In the concluding chapter of his 2010 handbook, ‘Moving the Scientific Study of Chinese Psychology into Our Twenty-First Century: Some Ways Forward,’ he quoted a paragraph from Arnett (2008):

> The role of indigenous theorizing, then, is to enlarge our repertoire of constructs and theories in describing and explaining the human condition using scientific best practice. Their ultimate function is to demonstrate how, “Within the four seas, all men are brothers”. Non-mainstream cultural groups like the Chinese can enlarge our conceptual ambit, and ground psychology in the whole of human reality, not just their Western, usually American, versions (p. 713).

The concluding chapter of *Handbook of Chinese Organizational Behavior*, which he co-edited with Huang (Huang & Bond, 2012), was even entitled ‘There is Nothing More American than Research on Chinese Organizational Behavior’ for the sake of urging his Chinese colleagues “to be more culturally sensitive.” In fact, the Chinese version of a famous Confucian saying, “learning without thinking leads to confusion; thinking without learning ends in peril,” was engraved on the book’s cover.
NEROSCIENCE OR CULTURAL SYSTEM

It seems to me that a more culturally sensitive future can be achieved by the cultural system approach, but not by a pan-cultural dimensional approach. Unfortunately, Kitayama and his colleagues have proceeded in direct opposition to the approach indicated in his earlier work. They have continued to compile a lot of data to show the cultural differences between European-Americans and Asian (particularly Japanese)-Americans by using not only various instruments for measuring attitudes, but also fMRI of neuroscience. When Kitayama was invited to give a one-hour keynote speech at the annual meeting of the Taiwan Psychological Association, he presented data from a series of cross-cultural studies on neuroscience and interpreted his findings in terms of the coevolution of genetic, cultural and ecological differences between cultural groups over 10,000 years. At the end of his presentation, I asked him: “Can we explain cultural change by your approach?” He shook his head and said, “No.”

The programme had allocated only five minutes for questions and answers, so the section ended with many questions that had not been discussed in detail. In accordance with regulations of the Ministry of Science and Technology, the invited scholar who visits Taiwan with financial support from MST has to make two speeches in public. Therefore, two days later. The Department of Psychology, NTU, invited Prof. Kitayama to give a lecture on the topic of ‘Research of Cultural Neuroscience on Emotion: Achievement and Future Direction.’ I deliberately asked the organizer to give me an opportunity for public dialogue with him, presenting with a title of my choice: “Neuroscience or Cultural System: The Direction of Research for Cultural Psychology.”

GENE–CULTURE CO-EVOLUTIONARY THEORY

In his presentation, Kitayama presented a series of cross-cultural research in order to show various aspects of cultural differences in neuro-imaging. He explained these differences with a hypothesis of the co-evolution of genes and culture over thousands of years in different ecological environments (Kitayama & Huff, 2015).

The gene–culture co-evolutionary theory conceptualizes the human mind and brain as a byproduct of two kinds of evolutionary forces: genetics and culture. Akin to biological traits, cultural traits are supposed to be adaptive to, evolve with, and have influence on the social and
physical environments under which genetic selection operates. Adaptive neural machinery may arise not only via pressures of natural selection but also cultural selection. Neural mechanisms that facilitate the successful storage and transmission of cultural values, practices and beliefs are also likely to endure over successive generations due to their adaptive function (Boyd & Richardson, 1985). After his presentation, I asked Kitayama: “many psychologists have accumulated a lot of data to show the cultural differences between different cultural groups by using instruments for measuring attitudes, but they don’t know where the cultural difference comes from. Now you follow the mainstream of Western psychology to compile data to show cross-cultural differences of neuro-images and asked the same question: where the cultural differences come from? Do you have any way to verify or falsify your hypothesis about the co-evolution between gene and culture?”

“No,” he said, somewhat embarrassed.

**System View of Culture**

I showed some major paragraphs from the conclusion of Kitayama’s (2002) article published in the special issue of *Psychological Bulletin* entitled: *Culture and Basic Psychological Process: Toward a System View of Culture*, on the screen by PPT, read them and said, “Those arguments are very important. I used your paper as part of an assignment for my graduate students to support our approach of analyzing the Confucian cultural system.”

Kitayama said with a smile, “It is a paper published long time ago, I forget it.”

I said seriously, “You should not forget it.” I showed a figure of three cultural zones on the screen, abridged from three waves of the World Values Survey on 65 countries carried out by Inglehart and Baker (2000). Their data indicated that a history of Protestant or Islamic or Confucian traditions gives rise to three cultural zones with distinctive value systems that persist after controlling for the effects of economic development. Societies differ according to the dimensions of traditional vs. secular-rational, and survival vs. self-expression values, while most societies (including Western) are moving towards secular-rational and self-expressive values (indicative of modernity and post-modernity) at rates that maintain differences between those three cultural zones. Therefore, they draw the conclusion: “We doubt that the forces of
modernization will produce a *homogenized world culture* in the foreseeable future” (p. 49).

I continued: “Now most theories of social science were constructed in the presumption of individualism. Confucian cultural tradition does not support the value of individualism, it advocates for relationalism. But, we have only scarce culture-inclusive theories of Confucianism in psychology … You are the most famous Asian psychologist in the world, it is really pity what you have not had led the East Asian academic community to follow the correct way as you indicated before.”

**Conclusion**

I do not know Kitayama’s feelings about this confrontation. However, I do expect that Taiwanese Psychological Association, Ministry of Science and Technology, and Ministry of Education will reflect on the implications of this confrontation. Contemporary philosophy of science is a product of Western civilization, familiarity with scientific philosophy may enhance one’s ability of solving a scientific problem. From the perspective of post-positivism, a sincere scholar must identify the important problems to be resolved in his field and attempt to solve them with all his efforts (Hwang, 2013).

Unfortunately, most non-Western social scientists have only a fragmented understanding of Western philosophy of science. In order to publish SCI or SSCI papers in international journals, they tend to train graduate students from top universities to find ‘hot’ issues in international journals, to translate Western instruments of measurement into their own language, to follow Western paradigms of research, and to seek for possible outlets for their papers. Once their papers can be published in either domestic or international journals, all their deeds are legitimated. Students as authors can use their papers to apply for jobs, while professors as co-authors may utilize it for job promotions, fund applications, or award competitions. In contrast to the research of problem-solving orientation, a professor who indulges in research of this type may publish a lot of ‘junk papers’ without paying any attention to the work of theoretical construction.

The arrival of fMRI in Taiwan has intensified publication-oriented research to an incredible degree. Many professors find that it is a very easy way to organize research ‘gangs’ to manufacture papers in the name of neuropsychology, neuro-economy, neuro-marketing, and so on. They
publish short articles with a small piece of data and a large group of authors, but they are able to utilize this kind of publication to acquire research funds from the Ministry of Science and Technology by squeezing financial resources from other fields.

Professional associations should assume the responsibility for indicating the direction of future development for its members. Unfortunately, the Taiwanese Psychological Association tends to invite keynote speakers from US universities to talk about their own research findings, which are supposed to be the ‘normative practices’ of mainstream psychology for the graduate students or young scholars to follow. Ultimately, the scientific community is indulged in the atmosphere of self-colonialism without much reflection given to seeking outlets to escape from the long-term negligence of their own culture.

I understand that this confrontational dialogue is unlikely to change either Kitayama’s own approach of doing research, or the indulgence of The Taiwanese psychological community in abusing fMRI. However, I hope that this article may leave a record to enable the next generation to recognize the reason for academic decay over the two decades since the 1994 Educational Reform.

Kaohsiung, Taiwan

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Asian indigenous psychology is a particular form of Asian psychology, marked by its commitment to indigenous psychology (IP). An introduction to Asian indigenous psychology, therefore, needs to start with an overview of IP. The late Jahoda (2016) claimed that IP is in demise due to its intrinsic weaknesses, most notable among which are diversity, lack of consensus, lack of identity and lack of scientific rigor. For a formal rebuttal of Jahoda (2016), the reader may consult Hwang (2016). For our purposes, we use Jahoda’s (2016) critique as a key part of reaching a clearer vision of IP.
WHAT IS INDIGENOUS PSYCHOLOGY (IP)?

Put it succinctly, IP is an intellectual movement across the globe to resist the hegemony of Western psychology in representations of the human mind, and in investigations of local mentality. This definition has the following implications:

**Movement**

One way to understand an intellectual movement is to think of it as a mighty river with many tributaries such as critical psychology (Teo, 2015), postcolonial psychology (Hook, 2012), and psychology of First Nations (Wilson, 2008), none of which, however, are recognized by Jahoda (2016) as disciplines relevant to IP. Another way is to conceive of IP as a verb, not a noun. As a verb, IP refers to a dynamic ongoing process that is bound to change over time, including “radical” shifts “in [the] meaning of ‘IP’” (Jahoda, 2016, p. 178). As a process, all existing IPs are approximations to the visions of IP, rather than finished products. Of course, this is the way we judge any pursuit of ideals, including democracy. By contrast, Jahoda (2016) approaches IP as a noun—a static, finished product. This is characteristic of majority groups’ approach to minority groups, which are considered as something lesser in being hence relatively less dynamic and open ended. To complicate matters, Jahoda (2016) follows one particularly problematic definition of IP (Kim & Berry, 1993), which he himself points out; when that version of IP leads Jahoda down a dead-end street, he declares IP to be infeasible.

**Intellectual**

The intellectual attributes of IP have the following implications:

- To the extent that cultures are memes (Lindenfors, 2017), which are—like epidemics—not bound by national or geographical boundaries, IP and nationality are not synonymous terms. Mistakenly looking for IP along geographical and national divides, Jahoda (2016) found only one full-fledged IP of a particular country—Filipino psychology (Enriquez, 1993). This reinforced his suspicion as to whether IP really exists.